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Abstract: In June 2012 the European Commission received the backing of the member states 
to launch a visa liberalisation process with Turkey in exchange for a readmission agreement 
that obliges Ankara to take back illegal immigrants who passed through Turkey as a transit 
country. This is a remarkable development in view of the earlier rejection by several member 
states of the perspective of a visa free travel for Turkish citizens. My process tracing analysis 
suggests that the key to explaining this development is the argumentative strength of the Eu-
ropean Commission, stemming from the necessity of cooperation with Turkey on migration 
and the norms of procedures set in previous readmission negotiations, as well as the coalition 
between the Commission and the Danish Council Presidency. Thus, this article contributes to 
a better understanding of the dynamics of Turkey’s EU accession process, the role of the 
Commission in the EU’s visa policy, and the influence of Council Presidencies.  
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Introduction 
On 21 June 2012, the European Commission received the political mandate to start a visa lib-
eralisation process with Turkey in exchange for Turkey’s readiness to implement a readmis-
sion agreement that obliges Ankara to take back illegal immigrants who have used Turkey as 
a transit country on their way to the EU (Council 2012a). This development was unexpected 
in the light of the Council’s rejection of this linkage in February 2011, despite the lobbying 
efforts of the European Commission. Although the Council had invited the Commission to 
start a dialogue with the aim of facilitating the visa procedure for certain groups of people, 
general visa exemption was not the target. In particular, Germany, Austria, France and the 
Republic of Cyprus were against a visa waiver perspective for Turkey (German Press Associ-
ation 2011). The German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich was opposed to the visa free 
travel perspective of Turkish citizens as late as March 2012 (Stern 2012). 
The aim of this article is to analyse the factors which have contributed to the position change 
of the Council between February 2011 and June 2012, using the multiple stream model, de-
veloped by Kingdon (1995) and applied by Zahariadis (2008) to the EU context, as an analyt-
ical  framework.  This  approach  argues  that  the  interaction  of  three  relatively  independent 
streams - problems, policies and politics – may open a window of opportunity for policy 
change. Thereby, the problem stream deals with issues that are priorities for policy-makers 
and citizens, the policy stream consists of ideas or policy solutions to the identified problems, 
and the politics stream refers to the interest and power constellations in the Council. Accord-
ing to this model, EU polices are the result of coupling by policy entrepreneurs of these 
streams (Zahariadis 2008: 517). 
This multiple stream perspective has been used in the structuring of my process tracing analy-
sis,  which  is  based  on  my  recent  research  on  Turkey’s  new  readiness  for  a  readmission 
agreement in January 2011 (Bürgin 2012), an analysis of crucial policy documents and public 
statements of the involved actors, as well as semi-structured interviews with 20 officials from 
the Commission (8), the reluctant member states (Germany,5; France, 1; Austria, 1), the Dan-EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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ish Council Presidency (3) and Turkey (2). My finding is that the common policy entrepre-
neurship of European Commission and the Danish Council Presidency explains the outcome 
of the Council Conclusions in June 2012. Compared to the less favourable context conditions 
for the three streams in 2011, the intersection of favourable conditions in 2012 offered a win-
dow of opportunity for policy change which was successfully exploited by the Commission 
and the Danish Council Presidency. Relating to the problem stream, the need to cooperate 
with Turkey in the management of illegal migration flows regained its priority on the EU 
agenda in 2012 due to alarming Frontex reports after it had faded in importance in 2011 dur-
ing the migration movements of the Arab spring. Relating to the policy stream, the coherent 
application of EU norms of procedure established during the readmission negotiations with 
the Balkan countries, namely the linkage between readmission agreement and visa liberaliza-
tion, strengthened the position of the Commission who lobbied for the same linkage in the 
readmission negotiations with Turkey. In particular, preparations for the opening of a visa 
liberalization process with Kosovo in 2012 raised the question of the incoherent treatment of 
Turkey. Finally, regarding the politics stream, strong support for the Commission’s position 
was provided by the Danish Council presidency, which was perceived by the other member 
states as an honest broker between diverging interests, and thus contributed to the break-
through of the negotiations in June 2012.  
Thus, this case study contributes to a relatively neglected aspect in the theoretical inspired 
studies so far on institutional relationships within the EU by adding a focus on the coalition 
between the Commission and the Council Presidency. Whereas most work on the relationship 
between Council and Commission highlights either the power of the Commission in relation 
to the member states (Pollack 1997, Schmidt 2000, Thomson and Hosli 2006; for the suprana-
tional policy entrepreneurship of the Commission in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
see Kaunert 2009, Kaunert 2010, Kaunert and Della Giovanni 2010, Ucarer 2001), or the role 
of the Council Presidency within Council (Tallberg 2003, Adler et al. 2012, Kaczyński 2011a 
and 2011b, Tallberg 2003), e.g. such as the role of presidencies of smaller countries (Bengts-
son et al. 2004, Elgström 2003, Humphreys 1997, Thorhallson and Wivel 2006), this study 
shows how the synergies between the Commission and the Council Presidency are able to 
overcome the opposition of some member states.  
The article proceeds in five stages: First, I refer to the multiple stream model and the scientific 
debates about the role of Council Presidencies. Second, I show how the salience of a better 
migration management at the Greek-Turkish border has strengthened the position of both the 
Commission and also Turkey. Third, I analyze how the norms and procedures introduced in 
the readmission negotiations with the Balkan countries increased the agenda-setting power of 
those who demanded a coherent application in the case of Turkey. Fourth, I explain the unfa-
vourable interest and context constellation during the Hungarian and Polish Council Presiden-
cy in 2011. Finally, I show how the argumentative strength of the Commission, combined 
with the engagement of the Danish Council Presidency and favourable context conditions led 
to a breakthrough in the negotiations.  
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1.   Explaining policy change: Salience, coherence and windows of opportunities 
In order to conceptualise the ability of the European Commission to influence the outcome of 
the Council decisions, it is useful to apply the multiple stream model. This model was origi-
nally developed in the context of US politics by Kingdon (1995) and has been applied to the 
EU by Zahariadis (2008). This model suggests that the influence of supranational policy en-
trepreneurs depends on their ability to couple the three different streams: problems, polices 
and  politics.  Policy-making  starts  with  the  identification  of  a  problem  (problem  stream), 
which is influenced by the salience of a problem (Zahariadis 2008: 517), followed by a search 
for alternative solutions (policy stream). As the Commission has the right to initiate new leg-
islation, it has a comparative advantage to those entering in the later stages (Kaunert 2010: 
177), and therefore having to react to the Commission’s problem definitions and framing of 
solutions (Sauter 2009). Thereby, the expertise of the Commission, based on its network of 
diverse stakeholders, plays a pivotal role. In particular, the Commission integrates national 
civil servants into a multilevel community administration, which spans levels of governance 
and lobbies for support at the upper domestic political level for the principles and solutions 
established before in the EU committees (Lewis 1998, Trondal et al. 2005).  
Whether a proposed policy solution gains acceptability also depends on its similarity with 
previous policy decisions. Past experiences tend to guide search for new actions, and former, 
well-tried policies are often chosen as answers to emerging problems. According to this path-
dependent logic of historical institutionalism, established norms strengthen the position of 
those actors whose preferences are in line with these shared standards, because they can be 
justified by a ‘previous mutual consent and a familiar and tried strategy’ (Kohler-Koch 2000: 
517). These standards can therefore be used to exercise social pressure on actors with differ-
ing positions, who are rhetorically entrapped by commitments of the past (Schimmelfennig 
2003). Thus, the argumentative power of the Commission increases if it can present its posi-
tion or proposal as either fitting to already established policy principles and dominant dis-
courses (Kaunert 2007) or as being the coherent application of the acquis programme (Mayer 
2008).  
However,  while  the  argumentative  strength  of  the  European  Commission  in  the  agenda-
setting phase is a necessary precondition for its influence on the final Council decisions, it is 
not a sufficient one. The inter-institutional power balance between the Commission and the 
Council in the bargaining stage (the politics stream) is further contingent on a variety of fac-
tors which complicate general assessments about the power and autonomy of the Commission 
(Trondal 2007: 962). A well-studied constraining factor is the decision-making procedures in 
the Council. As Commission proposals are more easily accepted than modified, the Commis-
sion has conditional agenda-setting power (Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998) if a qualified majority 
in the Council prefers the Commission proposal to the status quo. The Commission’s influ-
ence also depends on its ability to break up existing coalitions or manipulate the Council’s 
default conditions (Schmidt 2000), which in turn depends on factors including the homogenei-
ty of its own position (Elgström and Larsen 2010), the ability of the governments to agree on 
package deals and side payments (Moravcsik 1998), the firmness of a position inside a mem-
ber states, the role of domestic officials in the Council working groups (Beyers and Trondal EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-009a.htm    5 
2004) and procedural ambiguities (Borras 2009). In the face of this variety of influencing fac-
tors, the multiple stream model rejects the belief that policy processes smoothly follow a ra-
tional or normative logic, and dismisses monocausal explanations. As a consequence, the mul-
tilevel policy-making in particular in the EU is characterized by unpredictability (Larson and 
Trondal 2006: 28). 
In the following, I argue that one constraining factor in this politics stream which deserves 
greater attention in the analysis of the power relation between the Commission and the Coun-
cil is the possible synergy created between the Council Presidency and the European Com-
mission in terms of common policy entrepreneurship. The Presidency can form an interest 
coalition with the Commission and thus open a window of opportunity for a policy solution, 
which the Commission is unable to open alone. Thus, in addition to the role of the European 
Commission in shaping the EU’s visa policy, my argument also contributes to the controver-
sial issue of the influence of the Council Presidency on the decisions of the Council (Tallberg 
2003: 1). Many scholars argue that the influence of the Presidency is limited by the neutrality 
norm, which prevents it pursuing national interests. Tallberg challenges this view and sug-
gests that the Council Presidency engages in agenda-shaping through the emphasizing and de-
emphasizing of alternative issues. He concludes: 
‘In the literature on the Council Presidency, this systematic form of influence is com-
monly reduced to a “flavour” that Presidencies may add to the EU agenda, in the ab-
sence of a true capacity to pursue national interests. In fact, it may be this “flavour” 
that most clearly embodies the effect of a particular Presidency on the EU’s agenda’ 
(Tallberg 2003: 9).  
Another debate refers to the respective influence of the presidencies of big and small member 
states. On the one hand, scholars refer to the limited agenda-shaping power of small states due 
to the limited size of their civil service (Humphreys 1997); on the other hand, scholars under-
line the particular influence of small country presidencies because their weakness facilitates 
the perception of the other member states that these are honest brokers focused on compro-
mise, whereas the big member state are regarded as taking advantage of their stronger posi-
tions to advance national interests (Elgström 2003). Bengtsson et al. (2004: 314) argue that 
the lack of traditional power resources can be compensated by normative power. Another cru-
cial aspect regarding the influence of the presidencies of small states is their closer coopera-
tion with the Commission. According to Thorhallson  and Wivel ‘small states look  at the 
Commission as a key partner in their attempt to build coalitions and thus try their utmost to 
get the Commission on their side before facing the large states in the Council of Ministers’ 
(2006: 660).  
Finally, a debate has emerged over the role and influence of the Council Presidency after the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which implies that the rotating Presidencies no longer 
chair the European Council meetings or the Foreign Affairs Council meetings, and that the 
newly established diplomatic service has taken over the role as chair of approximately 30 
Council working groups (Adler et al. 2012: 25). It is argued that ‘this effectively means that 
the rotating Presidency have lost a holistic overview of the political process in the Council’ EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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(Kaczyński 2011a: 29) and thus the rotating Presidency is confronted with a ‘risk of irrele-
vance’ (Kaczyński 2011b: 2).  
The following process tracing analysis shows how interplay of pressing problems, normative 
reasoning and the commitment of the Danish Council enabled the European Commission to 
overcome the reluctance of some member states to start a visa liberalisation process with Tur-
key.  
2.   Pressing problems: The salience of external border control 
The double challenge of international migration and open internal borders in the Schengen 
zone has forced the EU member states to develop a common migration policy. As intergov-
ernmental regulation of migration failed, the governments agreed in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
to communitarise immigration and asylum policies. One key element in the management of 
migration flows is the cooperation with third countries. Thus, with the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Commission received the competence to conclude readmission agreements on behalf of all 
Schengen EU member states. These agreements set out clear obligations and procedures for 
the return of those who are irregularly residing in the EU. The mandates were based upon a 
draft  model  readmission  agreement,  and  did  not  allow  the  Commission  much  flexibility 
(Trauner and Kruse 2008: 10).  
As one of the important transit routes for illegal immigrants, the Commission invited Turkey 
to begin negotiations on a draft text of a readmission agreement in March 2003. Turkey did 
not formally acknowledge the invitation until March 2004, however, due to concerns that it 
would become the final destination for third country nationals and stateless persons. There-
fore, Turkey insisted on first concluding readmission agreements with countries of origin to 
reduce the costs of implementing the EU readmission agreement (Bürgin 2012: 888). Howev-
er, the Commission created a link between the start of readmission talks and the start of the 
EU  accession  talks.  As  a  consequence,  Turkey  agreed  to  negotiations  on  a  readmission 
agreement in March 2004 (Coleman 2009: 181), which then began on 27 May 2005. The talks 
were abandoned without results in December 2006 (Commission 2007: 5). It is plausible that 
the halt in negotiations was heavily affected by the EU’s decision in December 2006 to freeze 
negotiations on eight chapters due to the impasse presented by the Cyprus problem. The pro-
spects for the readmission agreement negotiations deteriorated with the unilateral decision of 
Republic of Cyprus to block the opening of additional chapters in December 2009. Included 
was chapter 24, dealing with justice, freedom and security, thus weakening an incentive for 
Turkey to sign a readmission agreement in order to fulfil one of the benchmarks for the open-
ing of this chapter. 
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3.   Path dependency: The coherent application of procedural standards 
Without clear incentives,  not  only Turkey, but  most  other third countries with  which the 
Commission was holding negotiations were unwilling to commit to a readmission agreement. 
Therefore, the Commission repeatedly asked the Council to consider incentives for obtaining 
the cooperation of third countries in the conclusion of readmission agreements, e.g. more gen-
erous visa policies or increased quotas for migrant workers (Commission 2011a: 9, Trauner 
and Kruse 2008: 11). The member states finally realized that a more attractive package would 
be necessary and, in July 2004, authorized the Commission to negotiate not only on readmis-
sion but also on visa facilitation agreements with the Russian Federation (Commission 2004: 
12). These agreements include simplified procedures for various  groups, multi-entry visa, 
reduced fees and an abolition of fees for selected groups, but – contrary to visa liberalisation – 
do not lift the visa obligation. Shortly afterwards, the link between readmission and visa facil-
itation also became official for Ukraine and the member states eventually agreed to further 
examine a possible link between readmission and visa facilitation, albeit on a case-by-case 
basis (Council 2004: 18). This case-by-case approach soon became the standard approach and 
by the time the negotiations with the Western Balkan countries started in 2006, readmission 
and visa facilitation were linked from the very beginning (Kruse and Trauner 2008:11). Thus, 
the readmission agreements in the Balkan states, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, and Montenegro, in January 2008 coincided with the visa facilitation agreements. 
More important than the facilitations themselves was the dynamic they triggered regarding 
visa liberalisation. As reaffirmed in the joint declaration on the perspective of a mutual visa-
free travel regime, which was annexed to the visa facilitation agreement, visa facilitation was 
a first step towards visa-free travel. In December 2009, the EU lifted the visa obligation for 
Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. One year later Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina fol-
lowed.  
The Commission also offered Turkey visa facilitations in exchange for a readmission agree-
ment (Commission 2007: 5). However, in contrast to the practice in the Balkan countries, ne-
gotiations on visa facilitations should have started once Turkey signed a readmission agree-
ment. The visa facilitations themselves were not a strong enough incentive for the Turkish 
government for three reasons. First, the offered visa facilitation agreement delivers no signifi-
cant improvement in comparison to the facilitations enabled by the new visa code, in force 
since April 2010 and covering visas issued for short stays not exceeding 90 days in any 180-
day period. The visa code includes inter alia clear rules for the length of procedures, reduced 
fees for a selected group of persons, the facilitation of multi-entry visas, simplified procedures 
and the right of appeal of negative decisions (Commission 2010). These improvements come 
close to the advantages provided by a visa facilitation agreement. The remaining advantages 
of a visa facilitation agreement are reduced visa fees (35 euro instead of 60), a visa fee waiver 
for broader categories of persons, a slightly more comprehensive simplification of document 
requirements and a reduction in the processing period from 15 to 10 days. Second, Turkey 
insisted on a procedure that was identical to what was offered to the Balkan countries, where 
the conclusion of a readmission agreement was the starting point for a visa liberalisation pro-
cess, based on a roadmap with a clear set of conditions to be fulfilled in order to abolish the 
visa duty (European Stability Initiative 2012). Third, Turkey argued that the Ankara Agree-EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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ment, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and the Customs Union agreement all 
necessitate that Turkey be given visa-free travel rights even before the Western Balkan Coun-
tries. This claim was legitimized by a decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 19 
February 2009. The Soysal judgment refers to the standstill clause of Article 41 of the Addi-
tional Protocol, which forbade the introduction of any new restrictions on the freedom of es-
tablishment and the freedom to provide services between member states. The Soysal ruling 
expressly stated that visa requirement as such constitutes a new restriction, and if the member 
state in question did not require such a visa at the time of the entry into force of the Additional 
Protocol of 23 November 1970, then Turkish nationals travelling to that member state did not 
require a visa. 
Because  of  these  three  factors,  further  incentives  were  necessary  in  order  to  revive  the 
blocked readmission talks. Thus, the Commission finally offered Turkey a visa dialogue with 
the clear goal of visa liberalisation once the readmission agreement is signed. This commit-
ment of the Commission paved the way for negotiations on a readmission agreement text, 
which was finally accepted by Turkey on 27 January 2011. Shortly before finalization, during 
a visit of the chief negotiators of the Commission on 13/14 January 2011 in Ankara, Commis-
sioner Cecilia Malmström confirmed support for the Turkish position: ‘This agreement will 
open the way to starting a serious visa dialogue with Turkey (...). The visa deal would facili-
tate visa procedures for students, businesspeople, athletes and artists. It would be expanded to 
all citizens in further stages’ (Hürriyet Daily News 2011). In addition to the visa liberalization 
incentive, domestic factors also contributed to the new readiness of the Turkish government 
for a readmission agreement. Irregular migration to Turkey has significantly increased in re-
cent years. Therefore, migration policy, in particular the modernisation of border management 
and asylum policy, has become a priority issue on the political agenda. These domestic devel-
opments contributed to considering the readmission agreement negotiations in the broader 
context of Turkey’s modernisation strategy. “Thus, whereas at the beginning the readmission 
negotiations were detached from the domestic political agenda, they now also meet domestic 
goals and discourses” (Bürgin 2012: 897).  
4.   Deadlock during the Hungarian and Polish Presidency 
Although not a legal requirement (European Stability Initiative 2012), the Commission pre-
ferred a political mandate for a visa liberalisation process from the Council of Ministers. 
However, the offered visa liberalisation process was in contradiction to the position of some 
member states. France, for instance, had already criticized the Commission for pursuing visa 
liberalisation talks with Western Balkan countries, both for political reasons and also because 
the risks associated with the opening of the EU borders were neglected. The Netherlands and 
Denmark have frequently been mentioned as hostile to opening the Schengen visa-free travel 
to Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Euractiv 2010). Germany was also against rapid visa 
liberalisation for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania but  eventually agreed. A governmental 
official said that the actions of the Commission in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Alba-
nia created a strong impetus for visa liberalisation, to which member states were only able to EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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react to by making a declaration that the visa liberalisation could be restricted again if abused 
(interview, 8 November 2010). 
The resistance to visa-free travel for Turkish citizens is much stronger, due to the expectation 
that many Turkish visitors will settle permanently, ignoring the maximum stay of 90 days in a 
180 days period, in addition to the existing political objections to Turkey’s EU membership. 
Germany,  for  instance,  was  opposed  to  the  linkage  the  Commission  made  first  between 
readmission  agreement  and  visa  facilitation,  and  later  between  readmission  and  visa 
liberalisation. According to an Interior Ministry official, Germany prefers to see a functioning 
readmission agreement first, before allowing a dialogue about a visa facilitation agreement to 
start. The official admitted that such a practice would differ from the practice of recently con-
cluded  readmission  agreements  and  confirmed  the  crucial  role  of  the  Commission:  ‘The 
Commission has communicated possible visa facilitations for Turkish citizens in exchange for 
the signing of the readmission agreement at a point in time as possible visa facilitations for 
Turkey were not even discussed among the member states’ (interview, 9 November 2010). 
Shortly before the approval of the readmission agreement text by the Justice and Home Af-
fairs Council, several sources indicated that France and Germany were leading the opposition 
to the easing of visa restrictions for Turkey. One diplomat stated: ‘We do not want any visa 
liberalisation or facilitation’. Another stressed the fact that EU ministers were discussing the 
readmission agreement ‘has nothing to do with visa liberalisation’ (German Press Association 
2011). Indeed, as a consequence of the Soysal-judgement of the European Court of Justice in 
February 2009, Germany decided that stays of up to two months without a visa would be 
permitted for a limited number of categories, including artists, sportspeople, scientists and 
also those responsible for cross border transportation. However, the Court decision did not 
change the German position regarding the general visa requirement for Turkish citizens.  
Due to the insistence of opponents of the visa liberalization process with Turkey, on 24 Feb-
ruary 2011 the Justice and Home Affairs Council invited the Commission to start a dialogue 
with Turkey about visa facilitations that excluded the target of general visa exemption (Coun-
cil 2011). The Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu countered by stating that Ankara 
would not put the agreement into effect until the EU launched talks aimed at visa liberalisa-
tion. 
For the rest of 2011, the visa liberalisation process did not regain priority in the Council meet-
ings. Neither the Hungarian nor the Polish Council Presidencies in 2011 were active support-
ers of the Commission in this policy file. This can first be explained by their national inter-
ests: Hungary and Poland are not significant target countries for illegal migration. Thus, the 
conclusion of a readmission agreement in order to return illegal immigrants to Turkey is not a 
salient issue in these countries. In addition, the special ties of Poland and Hungary to some of 
the most important opponents of a visa liberalisation process with Turkey made it unlikely 
that these countries would act against the interests of their closest partners. According Ka-
czyński, ‘Warsaw-Berlin relations are so close that some third countries officials have been 
informally complaining that the Poles are investing too much in Germany at the expense of 
other States’ (2011a: 44). According to a Commission official, dialogue forums such as the 
Weimar cooperation (Poland, France, Germany) and the Salzburg Forum (Austria, Poland, EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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Hungary) were used by Germany and Austria in order to underline their position regarding the 
visa regime towards Turkey (interview, 24 September 2012).  
The room for manoeuvre was further constrained by image problems and personnel disconti-
nuity. The Hungarian Presidency was characterized (as the previous newer member states 
Presidencies) ‘as a low profile one’ (Kaczyński 2011a: 44). Political leadership was particu-
larly hampered by the ambivalent reputation of the Orbán government, which is accused of 
restricting press freedoms and violating EU laws with new legislation that curbs the inde-
pendence of its central bank, data-protection agency and judiciary. In addition, the lacking 
continuity caused by the replacement of most of the civil servants responsible for running the 
Presidency after the spring election of 2010 further undermined EU trust in Hungary (Ka-
czyński 2011b: 3). Compared to Hungary, the subsequent Polish Presidency had more politi-
cal ambitions, because Warsaw considered its Presidency as the entrance on the scene of Po-
land as one of the EU’s heavyweights (Kaczyński 2011a: 44). However, during the Polish 
Presidency, the influence in the Justice and Home Affairs Council was also undermined by a 
change of the personnel. Following the October elections, Justice Minister Krzystof Kwi-
attkowski and Interior Minister Jerzy Miller were replaced in November 2011.  
In addition to the lack of policy entrepreneurship that characterized the Hungarian and Polish 
Presidencies regarding the readmission agreement and visa dialogue with Turkey, the context 
conditions were unfavourable during 2011. First, due to the Arab spring, the agenda of the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council was dominated by the refugee movements of these coun-
tries, the allocation of budget to deal with this challenge, and the subsequent demand of some 
member states such as France or Denmark to reintroduce border controls in the Schengen 
zone. Thus, an official of the German Ministry of Interior stated that the civil servants in 
charge of external border management focused on these issues, whereas the cooperation with 
Turkey was not a priority issue during those months of the Arab spring (interview, 14 October 
2011).  
The second condition concerned the negative experiences with the visa liberalisation for some 
Balkan states, which became a major priority of the Justice and Home Affairs Meetings in 
2011.  The  abolition  of  the  visa  duty  for  Serbia  and  Macedonia  (2009)  and  for  Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Albania (2010) caused a large number of asylum applications from migrants 
for purely economic reasons. Most of these were subsequently returned to their country of 
origin. A similar level of abuse of the rights to visa-free travel was expected in the case of 
Turkey. This was, according to an official of the German Ministry of Interior, not the atmos-
phere in which the supporters of a visa liberalisation process with Turkey were in a strong 
position (interview, 14 October 2011).  
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5.   Opening window of opportunity during the Danish Presidency 
During the Danish Presidency, a window of opportunity opened due to Presidency related 
factors and external developments. Unlike Hungary and Poland, Denmark is a target of illegal 
migration and thus has a national interest in returning illegal immigrants entering the country 
via Turkey. Although this national interest was acknowledged as an influencing factor by the 
interviewed Danish  officials, they  emphasized that an increase in  prestige for the Danish 
Council Presidency was the crucial motive in their efforts for a readmission/visa deal. Fur-
thermore, the Danish change in government in September 2011 played into the hands of the 
Commission. The previous centre-right coalition took a strong line on migration, announcing 
the reintroduction of permanent controls on its national borders in May 2011, and was hostile 
to opening the Schengen visa-free travel to Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast, the 
new centre-left government follows a more liberal migration policy. In addition to the nation-
al interests and the parties in office, the perception of the Danish government by the other 
member states (and Turkey) as an unbiased actor in Turkey-EU relations contributed to the 
breakthrough of the negotiations, because Denmark was trusted by the other countries to act 
as a balanced broker.  
Regarding the external factors, the salience of cooperation with Turkey became more obvious 
once the management of the refugees flows caused by the Arab spring ceased to dominate the 
agenda. In particular, alarming reports of the EU’s border agency Frontex (2012) indicated 
that the deployment of Frontex officials to the Greek-Turkish border in the second half of 
2011 was failing to reduce the number of illegal immigrants using Turkey as a transit country 
into the EU. In fact, the problems at the Greek-Turkish land border peaked with a 17 per cent 
increase of illegal border crossings from 47.700 in 2010 to around 53.500 in 2011. Thus, 80 
per cent of all new illegal immigrants to the EU followed this route, which is therefore re-
sponsible for a significant proportion of the 15 per cent increase of the number of the asylum 
seekers in the EU-27 in 2011 compared to the previous year (UNHCR 2012: 2).  
The salience of a readmission agreement with Turkey is further highlighted by the growing 
awareness that the problems at the EU’s external borders jeopardize the freedom of travel, a 
key achievement of the European integration process. In response to the increase in illegal 
migration, the member states decided to re-establish the possibility of intra-European border 
controls  when  a  Schengen  area  member  country  is  unable  to  control  illegal  immigration 
across its external frontiers (finally agreed on 7 June 2012). This decision was criticised by 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, who stated: ‘An external border that is not working should 
not be used as a pretext to close European borders’ (Europolitics 2012). In addition, the po-
rous Turkish-Greek borders have also caused increasing damage to the Dublin system. Under 
the Dublin regulation, the EU country of first entry is obliged to consider the claim of asylum 
seekers. Thus, asylum seekers who entered the EU via Greece can be returned there from oth-
er EU countries. However, rulings by the European Court of Justice have led to the suspen-
sion of returns to Greece (as well as to Italy and Hungary) because asylum seekers face a risk 
of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in these countries. According to a Dan-
ish official, the Dublin system is at risk of collapse and can only survive if the influx of immi-
grants is reduced to a more manageable level (interview, 25 September 2012).  EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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The problem of illegal migration via Turkey has the potential to further intensify with the im-
pending Schengen accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Once realised, this could increase their 
attractiveness to illegal immigrants as transit countries. The porous border between Turkey 
and neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria would have an even greater impact on illegal migra-
tion movements due to the direct access to other EU countries, once border controls are abol-
ished in the enlarged Schengen area. Due to a Dutch veto at the spring 2012 European Coun-
cil, justified by the claim that Romania and Bulgaria have not made the required progress 
against corruption and organised crime, the leaders of the European Union agreed to postpone 
a decision on admitting Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area, although this step 
seems inevitable. 
In addition to the salience of the problems at the EU’s south-eastern external border, the prep-
aration for the opening of a visa liberalisation process with Kosovo, finally realized on 14 
June 2012, once again raised the question of the incoherent treatment of Turkey. In particular, 
the Turkish politicians and diplomats repeatedly referred to the coherent application of the 
linkage between readmission agreement and a clear perspective for a visa liberalisation pro-
cess (Stiglmaier 2012: 102). A Turkish official said that the Turkish diplomats brought the 
topic onto the agenda at every possible opportunity, regardless of its suitability (interview, 17 
July 2012). In addition, Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate on migration by 
initialling a memorandum of understanding with Frontex on 15 March 2012.  
The  Turkish  position  was  further  strengthened  by  the  positive  agenda  which  was  jointly 
launched  by  Commissioner  for  Enlargement  and  European  Neighbourhood  Policy,  Štefan 
Füle, and the Turkish Minister for European Affairs and Chief EU negotiator, Egemen Bağış, 
in Ankara on 17 May 2012. The intension was to bring fresh dynamics into the EU-Turkey 
relations after a period of stagnation. Füle framed this process as a new way of communica-
tion and interaction based on the common goals and equality between the two sides (Commis-
sion 2012). As both the Commission and the diplomats supporting Turkey wanted to avoid 
the impression of window dressing, the pressure to deliver visible results increased, in particu-
lar because of the approaching Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in the second half of 
2012. During this time period, the official EU-Turkey relations were expected to come to a 
standstill because the Republic of Cyprus is not recognised by Turkey.  
The strategy of the Danish Presidency, in order to win the support of reluctant member states 
and elaborated in close interaction with the Commission, was to include a broader dialogue 
and cooperation framework between the EU and Turkey into the Council Conclusions about 
the visa liberalisation process. The purpose of this was to address the full range of Justice and 
Home Affairs policy fields, rather than remain limited to the scope of the roadmaps which 
have been applied by the Commission in the Balkan countries as a precondition for lifting the 
visa duty. The intension of the Danish Council Presidency was to promote greater EU-Turkey 
cooperation in inter alia the combat against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking, 
efforts which are in the interest of both parties. 
In early spring 2012, the initiative of the Danish Presidency received cautious support from 
German officials of the Interior Ministry, who had realized in the aftermath of the February 
2011  decision  that  the  previous  position  of  Germany,  namely  a  functioning  readmission EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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agreement as a precondition for bringing visa liberalisation onto the agenda, was unrealistic. 
Therefore, the German officials started to rethink the two conflicting policy goals: the return 
of illegal immigrants and the benefits of cooperation with Turkey in Justice and Home Affairs 
on the one hand, and the security concerns regarding asylum seekers from Turkey, and Turk-
ish travellers who overstay the allowed 90 days period of visa free travel, on the other. The 
fact that the foreign ministry (Liberals), which had a more positive approach regarding the 
possibility  of  a  visa  liberalisation  process,  was  finally  also  supported  by  the  chancellery 
(CDU) further increased the pressure on the hesitant Interior Minister Friedrich (CSU), who, 
however, also faced the problem of the opposition from his own party members against visa-
free travel for Turkish citizens.  
According to a German official, the broader dialogue approach provided an opportunity for 
greater German flexibility on the visa issue (interview, 19 September 2012). A Danish official 
added that the challenge was to find a balanced wording that included enough safeguards and 
requirements for the sceptical states, but was still acceptable for the Turkish side (interview, 
25 September 2012). A draft text for the Council Conclusions was first discussed in the stra-
tegic committee on immigration and asylum, a working group related to COREPER. Howev-
er, according to the Danish interview partner, even the high-ranking German civil servants 
participating in this meeting were uncertain whether the draft text would be acceptable to the 
minister. The Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 26 April 2012 (Council 2012b), 
in which Minister Friedrich raised no objection to the draft Council Conclusions, was the 
turning point. This was an important signal for the Danish Presidency that Germany was in 
principle willing to accept the Danish draft text. 
In spring 2012, the draft of the Danish Presidency also received positive signals from the 
French civil servants, who stressed, however, that there would be no official position before 
presidential and parliamentary election in May and June. The reason for this delay was Sar-
kozy’s election campaign’s uncompromising stance on border control and immigration. The 
non-position of France was an indicator for Denmark that France was probably aiming to 
postpone the file until after the Danish Presidency. According to a European Commission 
official (interview, 19 September 2012), the French reluctance in February 2011 was partly 
explained by solidarity with Germany. Therefore, the position change of Germany and the 
electoral success of Francois Hollande, who articulated the general political will to repair rela-
tionships with Turkey, facilitated French support for the Danish Council Conclusions. French 
scepticism was further softened by the introduction of a new visa suspension mechanism, 
which was promoted by France as a reaction to the misuse of the visa-free regime for purpos-
es other than the intended short-term travel to the EU. Announced by the Commission on 24 
May 2011, the safeguard clause allows the temporary suspension of a visa waiver of third-
country nationals in clearly defined emergency situations, for example, in case of a sudden 
high influx of irregular migrants or a sudden increase of unwarranted asylum requests from a 
third country (Commission 2011b). 
The crumbling opposition of France and Germany also had an impact on the remaining reluc-
tant member states, the Benelux countries and Austria. A Danish official stressed that a par-
ticular pattern of EU policy-making emerged in the last weeks of the Danish Presidency: As 
soon as a more powerful member state shifts its position, smaller states in a coalition with this EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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country follow. In the case of Austria, accompanying these Council related dynamics, a re-
composition of the government also played into the hands of the Commission and the Danish 
Council Presidency. The Austrian Interior Minister, Maria Fekter, became Finance Minister 
on 21 April 2011 and was replaced by Johanna Mikl-Leitner. The same Danish official and 
also a Commission official stated that Fekter was as hard-line opponent of the visa liberalisa-
tion process, while her successor was a more flexible negotiation partner (interviews, 14 and 
19 September 2012).  
A final obstacle was removed when the Republic of Cyprus, which was prepared to accept 
isolation when its Turkey related interests were at stake, decided not to block the opening of 
the visa liberalisation process. According to a Danish official (interview, 25 September 2012), 
the Republic of Cyprus was unwilling to be held responsible for a failure of the negotiations 
on the eve of its own Presidency. Another factor in this decision was its agenda for the Coun-
cil Conclusions was agreed upon; in particular, Turkey was required to cooperate with all 
member states in the broader dialogue. In the Council Conclusion, adopted on 21 June, the 
member states invited the European Commission to take steps towards visa liberalisation as a 
gradual and long-term perspective, and stressed that progress depends on the effective and 
consistent implementation of the requirements by Turkey. These particularly focussed on the 
full implementation of the readmission agreement vis-à-vis all member states, an effective 
cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs issues with all member states, the improved man-
agement of mixed migration flows at its borders, and an alignment with the EU’s visa and 
asylum policy (Council 2012a, point 8). 
Conclusion 
This contribution illustrates how the intersection of favourable conditions in problem-, policy- 
and politics stream opened a window of opportunity for policy change. Thereby, the salience 
of illegal migration into the EU and the normative logic of offering Turkey the same proce-
dures as in the Balkan precedent have strengthened the argumentative position of the Com-
mission, which, despite the opposition of some member states, was able to open the way for 
the visa liberalisation process with Turkey to begin in return for a readmission agreement. 
With reference to the credibility of the EU, the Commission argued that in the light of the 
abolition of the visa obligation for the Balkan countries, and visa liberalisation talks with Rus-
sia and Ukraine, it was no longer defensible to deny the same process to Turkey. Thus, this 
analysis lends support to those scholars who stress the importance of norm construction and 
normative entrapment in the institutional relationship within the EU (Schimmelfennig 2003). 
Even if the argumentative strength of the Commission was an important precondition for 
change in  the Council, it was  not  a sufficient one, and it would not have been achieved 
without  such  favorable  context  conditions.  The  most  important  of  these  was  the  synergy 
betewen the Danish Council Presidency and the Commission. Together they were able to 
increase the pressure on reluctant or hesitant member states. Thereby, the Danish government 
benefitted from its reputation of being considered as a rather neutral mediator between the 
different positions as it is neither a strong supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, nor a strong EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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opponent. The engagement of the Danish officials, who were in intensive exchange with the 
involved ministries of the reluctant member states, strengthened the position of those actors in 
the reluctant member states who held a more flexible view regarding the visa liberalisation 
perspective for Turkish citizens, but had not previously been able to convince their colleagues 
in the inner-ministerial and the inter-ministerial dialogues. This study thus highlights how the 
Council Presidency can change the opportunity structure and the power relations at the do-
mestic level, and illustrates the political role of the Council Presidency. Contrary to contribu-
tions which claim that the Council Presidency is in danger of becoming irrelevant due to the 
changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty (Kaczyński 2011b), this contribution indicates the 
continuing significance of the Council Presidency. In particular, it highlights the possible syn-
ergy effect of a common policy entrepreneurship between the Council Presidency and the 
Commission, an aspect which deserves greater attention in the theory-inspired research of 
inter-institutional power relations in the EU, in which ‘conventional wisdom views policy 
choice in the European Union mainly as a struggle between member governments and Euro-
pean institutions’ (Zahariadis 2008: 514).  
Regarding the political relevance of this case study, the start of a visa liberalisation process 
may have a positive impact on the flagging accession talks. Contrary to assessments that the 
Commission has become less committed to Turkey’s EU accession (Icener et al. 2008), this 
contribution indicates that the Commission remains a strong ally. The close cooperation be-
tween the two sides during the negotiations of a readmission text and the Commission’s sup-
port of a visa liberalisation perspective may help to recreate the trust lost due to the slow pro-
gress of the accession talks. The broader dialogue and cooperation framework on migration 
issues has a similar potential to improve the relationship between Turkey and the EU member 
states. The management of migration flows is in the interest of both the EU and Turkey, in-
creasingly seen as a destination by immigrants rather than a transit country. This is shown by 
the 74 per cent increase in asylum seekers between 2010 and 2011 (UNHCR 2012: 2). Be-
yond the formal accession talks, in which Turkey plays a more subservient role, this new dia-
logue has greater potential for an exchange based on equality. If this leads to more mutual 
trust, it could positively affect the accession talks. 
However, there are still many requirements to be fulfilled by Turkey in the visa liberalisation 
process, as defined in a roadmap which has yet to be officially published. For instance, the 
harmonization with the EU’s asylum policy comprises the demand to lift the geographical 
limitations of the Geneva Convention, according to which Turkey only recognises refugees 
from European countries. A new Law on Foreigners and International Protection aims to im-
prove the living conditions and rights of asylum seekers in Turkey, but retains the geograph-
ical limitation of the Geneva Convention. So far, Turkey’s official position was to link the 
lifting of this restriction with its accession to the EU. Another problem is the harmonization of 
the visa regime. Turkey has benefitted economically from lifting its visa obligation for many 
countries in its neighbourhood and in Africa, whose citizens still require a visa for travelling 
to the EU. An alignment with the EU’s visa regime requires the (re)introduction of a visa ob-
ligation for these countries, which is likely to have a negative effect on economic ties with 
these countries.  EIoP    © 2013 by Alexander Bürgin 
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Finally, in addition to the challenges of the roadmap, there is a disagreement about the timing. 
Turkey favours the simultaneous implementation of the readmission agreement and the aboli-
tion of the visa requirement, whereas the EU sees the successful implementation of the read-
mission agreement as a condition for visa liberalization. Therefore, the assessment of Egemen 
Bağıs, that visa exemption for Turkish citizens will take effect in about three to four years 
(Hürriyet Daily News 2012), is rather optimistic. 
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